Epoch ReadingField NotesOne-pager 035
Personhood lives in the structure of the will: only a person can want which of its own desires wins.Harry G. Frankfurt · Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person · The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1 · January 14, 1971
Frankfurt opens by taking the word 'person' back from Strawson: having a mind and a body is not enough. What is peculiarly human is the capacity to form second-order desires, desires about one's own desires, and the ones that matter are second-order volitions: wanting a desire to be your will, the effective desire that moves you all the way to action. A creature with desires but no second-order volitions is a wanton; it does not care which of its inclinations wins. The unwilling addict fights his own effective desire; the wanton addict cannot lose because he never had a stake. Identification with one desire over another is how a person makes a will his own, freedom of the will is being free to will what you want to will, and moral responsibility survives even where that freedom fails, the willing addict takes the drug freely. Read start to seal in one sitting, 08.24, 1:28 P.M. to 9:31 P.M. The margins ran it onto the Dennett-versus-Gödel Substack debate, NPCs, DUI drivers, sober alcoholics, 1984, the Second Amendment, Nagel’s Absurdity at the higher-order regress, the career military man, the lazy gamer, arresting the parents of a school shooter, and a river finally breaking through a beaver’s dam — and kept pressing one amendment Frankfurt never makes: the levels need rank, rationale, and a number.
“Started 08/24/26 @ 1:28 P.M.”pp. 5–2008 · 24 · 2026