“First, in that sense of ‘justified’ in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.”
p.121 · the first crack, underlined
“But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.”
p.122 · Case I lands, the pocket passage
“If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.”
p.123 · Case II, boxed in his hand
“These two examples show that definition (a) does not state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition.”
p.123 · the whole paper in one sentence, three pages in